

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Update on NIST Standard/Guidelines

Convening to Act

Accelerating U.S. Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption: From Standards to Deployment

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
Cryptographic Standards Program

- Research, develop, engineer, and produce standards, guidelines, recommendations, and best practices for cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.
- Promote the use of validated cryptography, and inform federal cryptography procurement decisions, through the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) and the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP).

Program at a Glance



- **Quantum computers threaten the security of widely-deployed public key cryptosystems**
 - *Signatures*– ECDSA, RSA
 - *Key Establishment*–Diffie-Hellman, RSA
- Need for new cryptographic algorithms and standards based on different mathematical problems that can withstand attacks by quantum computers
- Quantum algorithms have a much smaller impact on the security of symmetric-key cryptography



The First Set of NIST PQC Standards



Published August 2024

FIPS 203

Module-Lattice-Based
Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Standard

(CRYSTALS-Kyber)

- A module learning with errors (MLWE)-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)
- Good performance on different platforms
- Moderate public-key and ciphertext size
- Suitable for applications requiring key establishment for encryption

FIPS 204

Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Standard

(CRYSTALS-Dilithium)

- A lattice-based digital signature algorithm based on the Fiat-Shamir paradigm
- Good performance, simple implementation
- Moderate public-key and signature size
- Suitable for general applications requiring digital signatures

FIPS 205

Stateless Hash-Based Digital
Signature Standard

(SPHINCS+)

- Conservative design based on security of well-understood cryptographic hash functions
- Does not state management by signers compared to earlier LMS/XMSS standards
- Solid security, signatures are longer compared with ML-DSA

Practical Considerations for Adoption


•Performance of PQC algorithms:

- Performance in key generation, encapsulation/decapsulation, signing/verification
- Bandwidth/space demanding for transmit/storage public key, signature, ciphertext

•PQC performance is comparable to commonly-deployed algorithms

•Public key and signature sizes are significantly larger than RSA and ECC signatures

- May lead to significant challenges in bandwidth-constrained use cases, e.g., GPS, Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication.



| Scheme | Public Key (bytes) | Private Key (bytes) | Signature (bytes) | Security Level |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--|
| RSA-3072 | 384 | 384 | 384 | Classical-128 |
| ECDSA-P256 | 64 | 32 | 256 | Classical-128 |
| ML-DSA-44 <i>(Dilithium2)</i> | 1312 | 2528 | 2420 | PQC Category 2 <i>(SHA3-256)</i> |
| ML-DSA-87 <i>(Dilithium5)</i> | 2592 | 4864 | 4595 | PQC Category 5 <i>(AES-256)</i> |

- Initial Public Draft released November 2024
 - Comment period ended *January 10th*
- Identifies quantum-vulnerable standards
 - Key establishment based on Diffie-Hellman and MQV over finite field and elliptic curves (SP 800-56A)
 - Key establishment based on RSA (SP 800-56B)
 - Digital signatures include RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA (FIPS 186-5)
- Proposed transition timelines for quantum-vulnerable algorithms
 - Deprecation after 2030
 - Disallowed after 2035
- NIST-approved symmetric primitives providing at least 128 bits of classical security continue to be approved

NIST Internal Report
NIST IR 8547 ipd

Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

Initial Public Draft

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This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8547.ipd>

Public key cryptography is a foundational tool for implementing security objectives and controls



Data Security (PR.DS): Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information

- **PR.DS-01:** The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected
- **PR.DS-02:** The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected
- **PR.DS-10:** The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected
- **PR.DS-11:** Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested

SC-8 TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY

Control: Protect the [*Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity*] of transmitted information.

SC-12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT

Control: Establish and manage cryptographic keys when cryptography is employed within the system in accordance with the following key management requirements: [*Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction*].

SC-13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

Control: a. Determine the [*Assignment: organization-defined cryptographic uses*]; and b. Implement the following types of cryptography required for each specified cryptographic use: [*Assignment: organization-defined types of cryptography for each specified cryptographic use*].

SC-17 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES

Control: a. Issue public key certificates under an [*Assignment: organization-defined certificate policy*] or obtain public key certificates from an approved service provider; and b. Include only approved trust anchors in trust stores or certificate stores managed by the organization.

SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST

Control: Protect the [*Selection (one or more): confidentiality; integrity*] of the following information at rest: [*Assignment: organization-defined information at rest*].





03.05.08 **Transmission and Storage Confidentiality**

Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of CUI during transmission and while in storage.

03.13.10 **Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management**

Establish and manage cryptographic keys in the system in accordance with the following key management requirements: [*Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction*].

03.13.11 **Cryptographic Protection**

Implement the following types of cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI: [*Assignment: organization-defined types of cryptography*].

Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP)

- Joint program between NIST and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS)

Automated Cryptographic Validation Testing System (ACVTS)


- Testing for algorithm standards to verify correct implementation of cryptographic standards
- Validated 81 implementations of **ML-DSA**, 33 of **SLH-DSA**, and 91 of **ML-KEM**



Vendors, Labs, and CMVP

- Vendors use independent, **NVLAP-accredited Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) laboratories** to test their modules. Over 20 labs worldwide.
- CST laboratories use the Derived Test Requirements (DTR), Implementation Guidance (IG) and other CMVP programmatic guidance to test conformance against FIPS 140-3.
- FIPS 140-3 and NIST SP 800-140 modify ISO/IEC 19790 and ISO/IEC 24759.

Migration Considerations



Standards– State of Migration


| Standard | Pure PQC encrypt | Hybrid PQ encrypt | Pure PQ sig | Hybrid PQ sig |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| SSH | <i>Drafts</i> | Some Adoption | <i>Drafts</i> | <i>Drafts</i> |
| TLS 1.2 | - | - | - | - |
| TLS 1.3 | Integrated | Broad Adoption | Integrated | <i>Drafts</i> |
| X.509 | Integrated | Finalization | Integrated | Finalization |
| S/MIME | Finalized | <i>Drafts</i> | Integrated | <i>Drafts</i> |
| OpenPGP | <i>In-Progress</i> | Finalization | Finalization | Finalization |
| IKE/IPSec | Some Adoption | Some Adoption | <i>Drafts</i> | <i>In-Progress</i> |
| MLS | Finalization | Finalization | Finalization | <i>In-Progress</i> |
| DNSSec | - | - | <i>Stalled</i> | <i>Stalled</i> |

Source: Post-Quantum Cryptography Coalition:
<https://pqcc.org/>

- **High-Impact Systems and Data Assets**
 - Accelerate PQC deployment – particularly for key agreement
 - Consider mitigating architectures/controls
- **Network Infrastructure**
 - Web Services – cloud services and locally-hosted
 - VPN clients/gateways and remote access
- **Identity & Trust Infrastructures**
 - Code Signing – support and usage
 - Authentication and Authorization Systems
- **Operational Technology with Long Lifecycles**
 - Integrate PQC into procurement, modernization, and refresh cycle
- **Legacy Systems**
 - Prepare to update or migrate systems and software



PQC– Much Work Remains

-  Operations
-  Infrastructure Modernization
-  PQC Adoption in Software/Systems
-  Hardware Acceleration/Support
-  Implementation in Cryptographic Libraries
-  Protocol/Application Standards
-  $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ Algorithm Standards



Contact Information

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NIST PQC standardization

www.nist.gov/pqcrypto

Sign up for *pqc-forum* mailing list

Email: pqc-comments@nist.gov

NCCoE PQC Migration Project

www.nccoe.nist.gov/applied-cryptography

Request to join Community of Interest

Email: applied-crypto-pqc@nist.gov